The Spanish copula estar has both well-known aspectual restrictions and evidential uses. Tibetan evidential 'dug also shows similar aspectual constraints. Both features are derived from assuming that the relevant property in both cases is a gradability, which establishes a comparison class between-individuals (yielding ser-predicates) or within-individuals property (yielding estar-predicates). A between-individual comparison class is anchored by the nature of the comparison, whereas a withinindividual comparison class must be contextually located. This location requirement results in the possibility of having evidential readings.
Introduction
The distinction between the two copular verbs ser and estar has received much attention in the literature, both traditional and contemporary (cf. Fernández Leborans, 1999; Camacho, 2012 for a summary of references). One general, if unstated goal has been to find an overarching analysis that can account for different aspects of the distribution of the two copular verbs. In this paper, I pursue two separate goals. At a general level, I suggest that no single, unified analysis accounts for the distribution of ser/estar, but rather that we require distinctions that operate at least at the lexical-semantic and pragmatic levels. The goal of achieving a unified account of copulas in Spanish has resulted in two families of analyses, those that ascribe the distinction between ser and estar to aspectual differences, and those that connect the distribution to pragmatic principles. Within the aspectual family, we find several lines, depending on how aspect is characterized. For some researchers, the aspectual primitive that best captures the differences is perfectivity (cf. Luján 1981; Roby 2009 ), for others it is change of state (cf. Fernandez Leborans, 1995) . Gumiel-Molina and Pérez-Jiménez (2012a,b) propose that the scalar properties of adjectives determine a subset of the distribution of ser/estar, whereas an influential group of analyses considers the individual/stage level (IL/SL) distinction as the basic concept that derives the syntax of copulas in Spanish (cf. Escandell-Vidal and Leonetti, 2002; Arche, 2006 , Asociación de Academias de la Lengua Española, 2009, a.o.) . The SL/IL distinction has been analyzed in different ways, for example following Kratzer's (1995) proposal that SL predicates have an additional spatiotemporal argument. Raposo and Uriagereka (1995) and Jiménez-Fernández (2012) , on the other hand, suggest that Kuroda's (1972) distinction between categorical and thetic judgements underlies the SL/IL distinction, and both proposals argue that these two constructions have distinct structures that map to crucially different assertion structures. Another way to approach the aspectual distinction between ser and estar relates it to the presence of a locative null preposition (cf. Zagona, 2012 and Gallego and Uriagereka, 2011) . Maienborn (2005) , on the other hand, argues that the lexical and syntactic structure of ser/estar is essentially the same, but whereas estar presupposes a specific topic situation, ser does not. As such, this approach relates the difference between the two verbs to a pragmatic condition.
In this paper, I propose that both lexical-syntactic constraints, and pragmatic constraints are required to account for the distribution of adjectival and nominal predicates. The first level involves the lexical interpretation of the predicate. Following Gumiel-Molina and Pérez-Jiménez 2012a,b; Gumiel-Molina et al. 2013, I assume that adjectival predicates establish a comparison class that can compare the relevant property either to different individuals (between-individual comparison) or to the same individual (within-individual comparison), yielding ser or estar respectively. When set in a context, the type of comparison class will either be located by default (in the case of a between-individual class), or have to be located through some contextual mechanism (in the case of a within-individual class). The need to locate the within-individual class, in turn, yields the possibility of having evidential readings.
I also compare evidential readings of estar to the distribution of the Tibetan evidential 'dug (cf. Agha, 1993; Garrett, 2001; Tournadre and Dorje, 2003; Kalsang et al., 2013) . Although connections between estar and evidentiality have been noted in the literature (cf. Escandell-Vidal and Leonetti, 2002; Maienborn, 2005 and Roby, 2009 ), this particular comparison attempts to explain why there seems to be a connection between evidentiality and SL-hood for both Spanish copulas and Tibetan evidential 'dug. This are derived from the contextual requirement to locate the within-individual comparison class.
Section 2., the paper describes the basic aspectual properties of ser/estar and the evidential readings of estar, as well as the evidential system of Tibetan and the aspectual restrictions of evidential 'dug. Section 3. presents analyses of the Spanish copulas and Tibetan evidential 'dug based on the stage/individual-level distinction, as well as arguments against such an analysis. Section 4.1 introduces the notion of comparison class as applied to ser/estar and 'dug and derives the evidential readings from the differences between comparison classes.
Parallelism between
ser/estar and Tibetan evidentials 2.1 Spanish copular verbs ser and estar
Aspectual properties
Many have noted before that the primary distinction between ser and estar is aspectual in some broad sense. Descriptively, predicates with estar are typically interpreted as delimited, a feature that has been characterized by some in terms of perfectivity, and by others, as a stage-level property. Two consequences follow from the aspectual distinction: on the one hand, some predicates are typically restricted to appearing with either ser or estar based on their meaning as illustrated in (1): arruinada 'ruined' can only appear with estar (cf. (1a)), and inteligente 'intelligent' with ser (cf. (1b)). It is also true that a predicates's typical interpretation can sometimes be coerced into the opposite value, as Escandell-Vidal and Leonetti (2002) On the other hand, certain predicates can be interpreted as delimited/stage-level if used with estar but as non-delimited/individuallevel if used with ser. Thus, verde 'green' is a temporary property of a banana in (2a) with estar, or it can be a defining characteristic of a tree's leaves when it appears with ser, as in (2b). The same holds for feliz 'happy' in (3) . (2) Second, it has frequently been noted that estar seems to imply a result without the corresponding cause that leads up to it. This is particularly salient for examples like el vaso está lleno 'the glass is full', where a "filling process" seems to be implied but only the result is stated. We will call this the 'lingering effect', which, as we will see, also appears with Tibetan 'dug. Third, as noted in Camacho (1994) a.o., estar cannot appear with DPs or NPs, as seen in (4a). The grammatical alternatives involve either a preposition de in front of the DP (as in (4b)) or the other copular verb ser (cf. Roy 2013 Maienborn (2005, 167) notes that "the speaker's claim is made on immediate evidence" with estar (cf. also Escandell-Vidal and Leonetti, 2002 and Roby, 2009, 17) . Consider, for example, (5)-(6). These sentences are appropriate when the relevant evidence is accessible to the speaker, whereas the counterparts with ser would simply be statements about a property of ham or of Pepe's sister. Escandell-Vidal and Leonetti (2002) connect evidential uses of estar (which they call "personal evaluation") with the fact that it is situation-dependent because it has a a spatiotemporal variable that needs to be anchored. In this, they follow the classical analysis of stage/individual-level predicates (cf. Kratzer, 1995, for example An anonymous reviewer points out that evidentiality effects surface with estar in contexts where the two copulas alternate (as in (11)-(6 above), so examples like (7a) are not a counterexample because only estar is possible in that context. However, it seems to me that the demonstrative in (8) induces an "evidential effect" (to the extent that it does) with both verbs. This suggests that estar's evidential meaning is indirectly derived and not part of the lexical meaning of estar. In fact, the more the situation involves deictic references, the more salient the evidential reading becomes. Thus, demonstratives favor an evidential reading, but generics disfavor it, as seen in (10), an example that does not require any type of direct evidence on the part of the speaker. Finally, person does not affect estar-related evidentiality, so that a first person subject is not more (or less) compatible with an evidential reading than a third person subject is, as seen in (11). However, (11b) seems to imply some overt manifestation of happiness/hunger that does not seem required for (11a). As we will see below, person does affect the distribution of Tibetan 'dug. Although evidentiality is optional with estar, the copula appears with the same type of predicate that can complement a perception verb, as illustrated in (12)- (13) (cf. Arche, 2006 , 20-21 and Asociación de Academias, 2009 , 2813 . In (12) we see examples of some possible predicates of two perception verbs, ver 'see' and oir 'hear', and in (13)- (14) we see that those same predicates can only appear with estar, not with ser ( (13b) The opposite pattern holds for ser: Predicates that only appear with the IL copula cannot appear as complements of perception verbs (cf. (15) vs. (16) and (17)). Note that (17b) would be grammatical if en el segundo piso 'on the second floor' is used as a restrictive modifier (i.e. 'the conference that was on the second floor, not the one on the third floor'), or if the PP is subject-oriented, but not as an object-oriented secondary predicate. As Arche (2006, 20-12) notes, when the predicate such as guapo 'handsome' or gracioso 'funny' is ambiguous between an SL/IL reading (and therefore compatible with ser or estar), using it with a perception verb, as in (18a) Arguably, complements of perception verbs have an evidential component (in the sense that perception verbs involve some type of evidence about the complement of the verb), which strengthens the connection between aspect and evidentiality.
Tibetan evidentials
Tibetan speakers signal the type of evidence for stating a proposition through a portmanteau morpheme on an auxiliary verb or copula. Evidential marking includes at least the following categories: ego, direct and indirect, as illustrated in (20)-(21). According to Garrett (2001, 102-3) , ego comprises sources of evidence centered on the speaker, and tend to impose a 1 st person interpretation in assertions, even when there is no grammatical 1 st person, as seen (20a). This example could be interpreted as either (20b-c), both with a 1 st person interpretation, but not as (20d). This type of evidential is found almost exclusively in Tibetan languages. There is less agreement on the evidential content of 'dug. Garrett (2001, 11) classifies it as a direct evidential, so that (21a), denotes that the speaker has first-hand experience in the situation s/he is uttering, but this evidence does not originate with the speaker. Agha (1993, 162, 215) , on the other hand, presents a more complex evidential picture for 'dug, one where it interacts with the main verb's aktionsart and with its own aspectual properties (see below). Thus, he notes that in (21b), "the speaker knows that Paama has been crying not because he saw him cry, but from some secondary evidence that he has been crying (p. 215)".
(21) a. kho he da.lta now kha.lag food za-gi-'dug eat-imp-evid 'He's eating now (eg. I see him).' (Garrett, 2001 , 15) b. Pama Pama ngus cry 'dug imp-evid 'Pama has cried/has been crying.' (Agha, 1993, 215, glosses adapted) Finally, the indirect evidential gi-yod in (22b) indicates that the speaker only has hearsay evidence about the situation.
(22) a. nyi.ma day rtag.par always bkra.shis-gis Tashi-erg tshong.khang store de that thong-gi-yod.red see-ind.ev.imp 'Tashi sees that store every day (eg. I'm told, I assume).' (Garrett, 2001, 14-5) Evidential morphemes can appear either as part of an auxiliary to the main verb (as in (21)), as copulas, or as the so-called elpa verbs that are used in existential, locative, possessive, and attributive contexts (hence the acronym). These are exemplified in (23). Kalsang et al. (2013, 4) argue that elpa verbs are copulas with an evidential morpheme attached, however Garrett (2001, 71) notes that elpa verbs and the corresponding copulas are not synonymous even when they mark the same type of evidentiality. Agha (1993, ch. 4 ) glosses copulas as factive, but not elpa verbs. For purposes of the current analysis, the syntactic status of elpa verbs is not essential, so long as their evidential properties are similar to those of copular verbs (which doesn't seem to be a contested point).
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Tibetan evidentials and aspect
In addition to being evidential, 'dug has some aspectual content identified as imperfective by Agha (1993) and as stage-level by Garrett (2001) . Agha describes this content as having some enduring effect which differs depending on the main verb's aktionsart and the presence and type of adverbs, which recalls the 'lingering' effect described for estar above. For example, if an end-point is specified (as in (24a)), the imperfective aspect indicates 'complete relative to a specific point', suggesting relevance beyond that endpoint (as in the present perfect in English). If the verb is durative, then 'dug allows for a progressive reading in addition to the present-perfect reading (cf. (24b) . (24) As noted, Garrett (2001) argues that evidential 'dug is a stage-level evidential with a spatiotemporal argument (cf. Kratzer, 1995) . In support of this claim, he points to several distributional properties. First, 'dug cannot appear in equative or predicative copular constructions with a DP (he does not give examples), whereas ego evidential yin and indirect evidential red are possible, as illustrated in (25) (Garrett, 2001, 13) Second, while different types of evidentials are possible with attributive copulas, the distribution of 'dug patterns as if it were SL. Consider (26), with indirect evidential red and (27b) with 'dug, used as an answer to (27a). In the second case, "the color is viewed as a temporary or impressionistic quality of the object in question" (Garrett, p. 69 Other predicates also alternate between different evidential markings in the manner predicted by the SL/IL distinction, as illustrated in (28). The first example makes a statement about the speaker's current state, whereas the second one is a general statement that may or may not be true today. As a consequence, the first one cannot be followed by "but today I am not happy", whereas the second one can (cf. Garrett, 2001, 73 (Garrett, 2001, 81, ex. 21-22) However, Kalsang et al. (2013, 554) point out that given the right context, the speaker can use 'dug in (30b), so observability (as characterized by Garrett) cannot be the right notion. This is shown in (31), where the context allows the speaker to draw the relevant information and use 'dug. Additionally, as (32) shows, the statement need not be restricted to the moment of speech, questioning whether the locatability property is also relevant. They conclude that in these examples, "[t]he direct evidential can be used because the situation of the dog being hungry is included in the situation of the dog rummaging around in the garbage dump, etc." (32) a. Over the past few weeks the speaker has often seen the dog right now rummaging around in garbage dumps, following tourists with food around, trying to take food away from other dogs and gulping down any food it is fed. 4 The situation may be slightly more complicated, according to Garrett (2001, 71) . He points out that elpa verbs and copular verbs need to be distinguished, regardless of evidentiality, because one can find pairs of examples with an elpa and a copular verb with the same evidential modality that are not synonymous, as seen in (i). Although he doesn't specify what the difference may be between examples with the same evidential marking, he suggests that "copulas are used for marking inherent features of objects, while elpa verbs are used for marking more subjective qualities of objects, perhaps along the lines of the distinction between the Spanish verbs ser and estar." Garrett (2001, 85) points out the contrast in (33), which strongly resembles the famous distinction in (34). (33a) can be generic, whereas (33b) must refer to a specific location and evidentiary event.
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Stage-level/individual-level analyses
The preceding sections have shown an interesting overlap between Tibetan evidentials and Spanish copular verbs. Given the distinct nature of both phenomena, the obvious question is whether this is a coincidence, or whether the same primitives connect aspect and direct evidentiality in Tibetan and in Spanish. One natural approach to account for the evidential properties of estar and the SL properties of 'dug stems from Kratzer's (1995) account of the SL/IL differences, as suggested above. Specifically, if estar and 'dug have a spatiotemporal argument, this argument will need to be anchored to a specific time and location, which in turn tends to favor situations in which the speaker has direct evidence. This is the suggestion Escandell-Vidal and Leonetti (2002) make for estar.
In a similar vein, Garrett (2001) argues that the direct evidential 'dug encodes an SL meaning formalized through a Kratzerstyle spatiotemporal variable. His analysis assumes that Tibetan direct evidentials involve three different layers. First, they project a situation (an event or state), second, they have a spatiotemporal argument bound by a demonstrative component Dem, and third, they contain a property Know, which relates to the fact that when "a person says something, he presents himself as knowing that thing (p. 53)." The combination of Dem and Know "enforces an observability restriction, which requires the situation described to have been directly observed by the origo [i.e. the speaker, J.C.]." The semantic representation for the spatiotemporal portion of the SL meaning is presented in (36), where "l" represents the spatiotemporal argument.
(36) a. Tashi is eating.
b.
[∃l] [Dem(l) ∧ eat(l, Tashi)] (Garrett, 2001, 57) In the following sections I will provide arguments against this specific implementation of the SL analysis. Kalsang et al. (2013, 552) argue that 'dug is [+imperfective], not SL, at least not in terms of having a spatiotemporal argument. They point out that in Garret's analysis, 'dug should only be compatible with SL predicates, or IL predicates that are coerced into an SL reading. In his analysis, coercion involves linking the predicate to a specific spatiotemporal location through 'dug's dem operator. This process is argued to happen with predicates of color, possession and generic attributes, as seen in (37), from Kalsang et al. (2013, 552) . However, these predicates still covey general properties and the use of 'dug does not make them delimited, coerced stages of the relevant property, but rather it signals that the speaker came to know the relevant property at some specific time or location. In other words, these examples involve restricted topic situations, not coerced SL predication. Based on these observations, Kalsang et al. (2013) conclude that Tibetan evidentials are best analyzed as relations between situations, building on Speas's (2010) analysis in the situation semantics framework (cf. Kratzer 2004, a.o.) . Specifically, evidential 'dug entails that the situation depicted by the proposition (the Evaluation Situation) is contained in the Information Situation, which contains the information necessary to assess that proposition. In section 4.1, I will characterize the evidential properties of 'dug as arising from the type of comparison class established by the predicate. I will suggest that like estar, 'dug involves a within-individual comparison class that needs to be located.
Arguments against the Stage-level/individual-level characterization of 'dug

Against the SL analysis of estar
The SL/IL analysis of ser/estar assumes that estar appears with SL predicates, and SL predicates go with estar (with some notable exceptions). On the other hand, not all of the properties usually ascribed to the SL/IL distinction pattern as expected with copular verbs in Spanish (cf. among others, Maienborn, 2005 and Camacho, 2012 , whose presentation I summarize here).
For example, frequency adverbs, which favor a SL reading, are possible with both ser and estar, as seen in (38). The reading of (38b) with ser seems to be that Luisa acted in an altruistic way several times a day. In other words, the sentence has a coerced SL reading, but the copula does not change to estar.
(38) a. En esa época, Luisa estaba disponible varias veces al día.
'During that period, Luisa.sl was available several times a day.' b. En esa época, Luisa era altruista varias veces al día.
'During that period, Luisa was.IL altruistic several times a day.' (Camacho, 2012, 460) Maienborn (2005, 163) notes that a location PP adjunct cannot modify estar + predicate, as seen in (39). This is unexpected if SL/estar involves some type of spatiotemporal argument that the PP identifies. However, we should note that the ungrammaticality of (39) shows that the whole combination of estar + predicate is not SL, but that still leaves open whether estar itself selects for a SL predicate, although the interpretation of estar + predicate has an aspectually delimited meaning. 5 I have preserved the original source's orthographic representation, which may be inconsistent with that of other examples. 6 An anonymous reviewer suggests that these examples "are not ungrammatical; rather, they are merely difficult to contextualize, since the state-of-affairs they describe is not consistent with what we know about how the world is. In fact, [(39a) ] means exactly what it should mean: that the shirt is wet only when put on the chair". I don't believe there is anything conceptually inconsistent with the state-of-affairs described by that sentence, in fact it can be expressed with la camisa está mojada cuando está sobre la silla 'the shirt is wet when it is on the chair'. This second sentence requires some creative context building, but (39a) still sounds ungrammatical to my ear in this creative scenario. In fact, (39b) seems like a perfectly reasonable scenario, but the sentence still sounds odd with estar.
(39) a. * La camisa está mojada sobre la silla.
'The shirt is.SL wet on the chair.' b. * El champán está tibio fuera de la nevera.
'The champagne is.SL warm outside the fridge.'
A second mismatch between SL/IL properties and ser/estar relates to conditional clauses. Only estar predicates appear as the restrictor of a when conditional (cf. (40a-b) ), as one would expect if it combines and denotes SL properties, although Schmitt (1992, 414) has discussed examples like (40c) that systematically appear with ser in Brazilian Portuguese and in Spanish.
(40) a. {Siempre que/Cuando} María está alegre, todo le sale bien. 'Whenever Maria is.sl in-a-good-mood, everything turns out well for her.' b. * {Siempre que/Cuando} María es alegre, todo le sale bien.
'Whenever Maria is.il in-a-good-mood, everything turns out well for her.' c. {Siempre que/Cuando} María es grosera/cruel/amable, es bastante grosera/ cruel/amable. 'Whenever Maria is rude/cruel/nice, she is really rude/cruel/nice.' (Camacho, 2012, 460) A different line of concern about the SL/IL analysis of copular verbs in Spanish relates to the actual characterization of the SL/IL distinction. Kratzer's (1995) initial analysis assigns an additional spatiotemporal argument to SL predicates, that anchors them to specific discourse spatiotemporal variables (cf. Jiménez-Fernández, 2012 for a specific account of ser/estar in those terms). However, the unavailability of locative PPs with SL predicates with estar casts some doubt on the viability of this analysis for ser/estar. Several researchers have proposed a different foundation for the SL/IL distinction, building on Kuroda's (1972) distinction between categorical and thetic judgements (cf. Higginbotham and Ramchand, 1996) . The former are statements about the subject, whereas the latter affirm the existence of an eventuality. Based on this idea, Raposo and Uriagereka (1995) argue that IL clauses are categorical (in the above sense), whereas SL clauses correspond to thetic judgements. In their analysis, the thetic/categorical distinction follows from the relative scope of the subject and the predicate in the tree: if the subject is higher, the sentence leads to a categorical judgement, if the predicate is higher, it leads to a thetic one. Arche (2006) also assumes the categorical/thetic judgement distinction, in particular she proposes that estar provides linking to an external situation variable, yielding a thetic judgment, whereas ser is predicated of an individual.
The challenge this analysis poses is to link the categorical/thetic classification with evidential meaning. In Arche's proposal this can still be accomplished, since she argues for linking estar to an external situation variable. We will return to this issue below.
Evidentiality and aspect
As we have seen, both Tibetan 'dug and Spanish estar appear with predicates that convey aspectual and evidential meaning. In the case of 'dug predicates, existing descriptions suggest that evidentiality is primary, whereas for estar predicates, I have argued that evidentiality is not always present. I will argue that evidentiality is the default by-product of the aspectual meaning, but in the case of 'dug, that mapping is stricter than for estar.
The aspectual component
Gumiel-Molina and Pérez-Jiménez (2012a; 2012b) and Gumiel-Molina et al. (2013) propose an analysis of ser/estar that relates the distribution of adjectives to their gradability properties, following Toledo and Sassoon (2011a; 2011b) . Specifically, they assume that gradable adjectives represent absolute or relative properties. Absolute interpretations depict properties compared to the same individual (the so-called within-individual comparison class), relative interpretations establish a comparison class between individuals (between-individuals comparison class). Absolute adjectives appear with estar, relative ones with ser. For example, alto 'tall' in (41a) is interpreted by comparison to other children, whereas for lleno 'full' in (41b), the degree of fullness is measured against other potential instances of the same glass. The general state of affairs is informally given in (42). A predicate like feliz 'happy' can be compared with other instances that apply to the same individual (X) within the same class, resulting in estar, or it can be compared with other instances applied to different individuals (X . . . Y), resulting in ser.
(42)
feliz 'happy'
Formally, Gumiel-Molina et al. (2013) propose that the relative/absolute distinction (i.e. whether the adjective is interpreted as a within-or between-individuals comparison class) is introduced by a functional projection pos (positive). The actual comparison class generated separately, so that an AP like (43a) is represented as (43b). Extending the idea presented in the preceding paragraphs to Tibetan evidentials would lead us to assume that 'dug involves an absolute interpretation (in the sense used above), namely a within-individual comparison class, as in (44).
(44) 'dug encodes an absolute (within-individual) comparison class.
Evidentiality
How does the characterization of estar/'dug as within-individual class comparisons connect with evidentiality? Consider what is involved in elucidating the meaning of a within-individual comparison class vs. a between-individual one, based on the scheme in (42). In the first case, the situation involves a comparison of properties that applies to a single individual, so the "slices" of properties are not individuated. In this sense, in order to elucidate whether the actual property obtains, the individual/property slice pair needs to be individuated, so that the relevant comparisons can be established, as in (45). Individuation locates the relevant slice-individual pair. The need to locate SL predicates has been at the core of several approaches based on Kratzer's (1995) proposal that SL predicates project an additional spatiotemporal argument (cf. Escandell-Vidal and Leonetti 2002; Arche 2006). Maienborn (2005) , on the other hand, suggests that estar presupposes a specific topic situation. The current approach assumes with Maienborn that SL predicates (within-individual comparisons) are individuated pragmatically, but it also assumes a different lexical-syntactic representation for sentences with ser and estar, namely one that distinguishes between within-individual and between-individual comparisons.
Because within-individual comparisons require individuation through location, evidentiality has a dedicated path to become potentially salient. The more evidential cues in the situation, the likelier an evidential interpretation will surface.
By contrast, between-individual comparisons can be establish without any further operation, since they apply to different individual/property pairs, hence each of them comes with implicit existential import. Individuation through location is not required, hence evidence has no dedicated path to become salient.
One important question is how the differences just described are introduced. From a syntactic point of view, I assume that the intuition behind the scheme in (42) corresponds to a structural difference. In particular, I assume Raposo and Uriagereka's (1995) proposal that thetic judgements (with estar) are higher than categorical ones (with ser). However, since I am assuming (following Gumiel-Molina et al. 2013 that the aspectual difference is introduced by the predicate, not by the copula, I propose the representations in (46), where X represents a projection of the predicate (the adjective or the noun). Within-individual comparisons arise when the predicate takes scope over the subject (cf. (46a) ), and between-individual differences arise when the subject takes scope over the predicate (as in (46b) ). In order to establish the comparison class, the first case will require a single property distributed over the same individual, hence the slice-individual pairing. In the second case, an individual/property pair can be compared to other (implicit) individual/property pairs (cf. also Diesing 1992; Kratzer 1995 for a structurally different representation of SL/IL predicates).
The representation in (46a) states that Deg raises to the specifier of DegP, under the assumption that Deg holds the relative/absolute properties of the adjective (as in (43) In sum, the slice-of-subject reading is simply the result of the semantic meaning of the predicate as gradable in conjunction with the scope relations in (46a) and (46b).
Let us turn to how this analysis applies to the facts described earlier. First, consider one of the observations noted in (30) about 'dug. As seen in the repeated examples in (47), in the absence of a context, 'dug can only be used in 1 st person but not in 2 nd or 3 rd person, presumably because the speaker only has direct access to his/her own internal states. If 'dug involves a withinindividual comparison class, the absence of a context means that no comparison classes can be established regarding internal states of the addressee or another participant, but the speaker does have access to different pairs of his own individual/property slices. Whenever the right context is given for 2 nd or 3 rd person subjects, then the individual/property slices are located and evidentiality can be linked to this location. In plain words, I can tell when I am hungry by comparison to other instances in which I have not been hungry. However, when speaking about the addressee or third person, the comparison does not directly involve comparing stages of the speaker, so the only way in which I can have access to those stages is by contextual evidence, as we saw in (31)- (32). (47) (Garrett, 2001, 81, ex. 21-22) The analysis also explains Agha's (1993) observation that 'dug may convey direct evidence (as in (21a) above), or indirect knowledge (as in (21b) above). Since the evidential effect is contextually derived from the requirement to individuate an individual/property slice pair, the actual type of evidence will depend on other elements. First-persons will tend to involve direct evidence, but past-tense situations may not. For estar, the basic analysis would be similar: examples like (5)- (6) above, repeated below, involve pairs of individual/propertyslices resulting from the within-individual comparison predicate taking scope over the subject, hence these pairs need to be located, and the context allows for a direct-evidence interpretation. This interpretation is favored by the demonstrative in (48a), (49b), by the present tense in all of the examples, and plausibly the preceding discourse background in (48b), (49b). (48) The proposed analysis can help explain the contrast observed in (50)-(51). A statement like the first part of (50a) with estar can be followed by a denial that the situation holds generally, but not by a denial that the situation doesn't currently hold (cf. (50b).
Because estar requires individuation that anchors it to moment-of-speech, it makes no commitments to the general validity of that situation, so (50a) is perfectly sensible, but (50b) is not. In the case of ser, the opposite is true (cf. (51a)): ser does not require individuation, hence no entailment of moment-ofspeech anchoring, so the first clause isn't interpreted as a statement restricted to the moment of speech and the denial of that situation yields a contradiction. Conversely, if the followup specifies the time frame as moment of speech, no contradiction arises (cf. (51b) As noted, Tibetan 'dug differs from estar in that the former seems to be obligatorily (and perhaps primarily) evidential, whereas estar is not. Put another way, there are no non-evidential uses of 'dug (to the best of my knowledge), but there are non-evidential uses of estar. One manifestation of this difference relates to the person distinction effect noted for 'dug (cf. (47)). As noted, without a clear context, only first persons allow for 'dug with predicates like 'be hungry'. This is not the case in Spanish, as seen in (11) I take the absence of person asymmetries with estar vs. 'dug to be independent of the principles that drive the distribution we have been discussing. In this respect, Denwood (1999, 136) describes interactions between two different categories: evidentiality (source of evidence) and viewpoint (self or other). For example, -byung. indicates 'self-centered', witnessed, whereas -song indicates 'other-centered', witnessed. -red, on the other hand, indicates unwitnessed (with no distinction for self-or other-centered), as seen in (53). It should be stressed that these viewpoint morphemes are not the same as person, and they are not agreement, since the two types of viewpoint (self and other) can appear with the same person. give-other.dir.evid 'He gave it (to someone else).' (Denwood 1999, 143) c. kho he phyin-pa-red go-past-ind.evid 'He left (I infer it)' (Garrett 2001, 14) These categories interact in complex ways (cf. Agha 1993; Denwood 1999; Garrett 2001) , but these examples suggest that viewpoint and evidentiality are independent properties in Tibetan. Viewpoint serves as a way to provide the contextual individuation for 'dug in a way that is not systematically present in Spanish (because Spanish lacks a grammatical expression of viewpoint).
*Estar + D/NP
Next, let's consider the observation that DPs cannot appear with estar (or with 'dug). I will argue that this restriction stems from the fact that D/NPs are not gradable, hence cannot establish a comparison class by themselves. In Gumiel-Molina et al. 's (2013) approach, D/NPs lack the DegP functional architecture. Many authors have claimed that nominals may be gradable (cf. Bolinger, 1972; Sassoon, 2007 Sassoon, , 2011 Morzycki, 2009 ), based on a number of tests such as the ones illustrated in (54) (cf. Bolinger, 1972; Constantinescu, 2011) . In each of these examples, the NP (amigo 'friend', inútil 'useless person' and tonto 'fool') is modified by another category that indicates a high degree of the property associated with the NP, so that (54a) means 'Pedro is a friend to a high degree.' If these are instances of degrees of a property, they certainly do not constitute within-individual comparisons. Thus, (54a), for example, does not compare degrees of Pedro's friendship to other instances of his being a friend, but rather to common standards of friendship across different individuals.
On the other hand, Constantinescu (2011) argues that alleged D/NP gradability is different from adjectival gradability. She notes that the proposed tests don't necessarily yield a consistent set of gradable nouns, and that when they are applied to nominals, they may be signalling slightly different properties than gradability does for adjectives. In effect, she reaches the conclusion that nouns are not gradable in the way that adjectives are. For example, degree quantifiers like more, más quantify over different properties in nouns than in adjectives, as illustrated in (55). Más inteligente 'more intelligent' compares degrees of intelligence, whereas más libros 'more books' compares amounts of books. economía. economics 'The library bought more self-help books than Economics books Constantinescu (2011) assumes that gradability should be analyzed as the presence of a salient ordering in the domain of an adjective, and argues that what makes nouns different is that they cannot establish an ordering in their domains.
9 If she is right, then adjectives are gradable but nominals are not, and we can ascribe the ungrammaticality of *estar + D/NP to the lack of ordered domains for nominals. The explanation for the grammaticality of (4b) with de, repeated below would follow if de introduces the necessary domain ordering. Formally, de heads pos, the degree head associated with adjectives (cf. 43).
(56) Obama Obama está is.sl de of presidente president 'Obama is (temporarily, currently) president'
Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued that explaining the distribution of ser and estar requires at least two types of constraints: an aspectual domain that determines whether the predicate is gradable (estar lexicalizes absolute predicates and within-individual comparisons, ser relative properties and between-individual comparisons), and a pragmatic constraint that facilitates evidential interpretations for absolute predicates. Within-individual comparisons give rise to individual/property-slice pairs that need to be individuated by locating them. Once located, evidentiality can be readily expressed. Finally, I have argued that Tibetan 'dug is primarily evidential by virtue of a separate property of Tibetan, namely the presence of a grammatical category for viewpoint that signals whether the proposition is self-centered or other-centered. This additional category acts as a default locating-device for individual/property-slice pairs, so evidential content is much more readily available. The impossibility of having DPs with estar relates to the fact that DPs cannot be graded because they lack the relevant functional projection. Once this structure is introduced (through de), they become gradable and can appear with estar.
